The othering of LGBTQ+ people by Polish nationalism

LGBTQ+ people in Poland face increasing discrimination at the hand of Polish national, regional and local governments. The Law and Justice (PiS) party, which is the current majority party, has homophobic and transphobic views and has manifested these to gain popularity with the Polish populace (BBC News, 2020).  endorsement of ‘LGBT-free zones’ throughout Poland (Human Rights Watch, 2020).

To an outsider this might seem unrelated to Polish nationalism, which the aforementioned party also employs as a political tool. What is interesting, however, is that for many who do identify with Polish nationalism, the two go hand in hand. It is, in any case, a form of exclusive nationalism (Hechter, 2000). Hence why this  will offer a brief exploration of Polish nationalism and its relation to the oppression of sexual and gender minorities.

Outsiders in Polishness

In Polish nationalist discourse, those who do not conform to the cis- and heteronormative society are not just shunned but seen as outsiders: outsiders who spew an ideology that is destructive to Polish society. Sexual and gender minorities are considered to be breaking a rule. This rule is created by those who see themselves as the owners of Polish nationalism, and Polish nationalists see the rule as commonsensical and label those who break it as outsiders. However, the rule is socially situated in Polish nationalism, and so is the process of labelling (Becker, 1963). Exploring how LGBTQ+ people acquired this outsideness through Polishness requires a brief theorization of Polishness.

The choice of othering LGBTQ+ people is rooted in the nature of Polish nationalism. This, similar to the choice of the othered group in other nationalisms, is not arbitrary, but socially motivated.

At the same time, the ‘LGBT ideology’ is put in the same category as communism (BBC News, 2020). This framing appeals to the Polish collective memory of the Soviet era and seems to function as a way to other LGBTQ+ people, since communism was seen as imposed on the Polish from the outside . In the Polish narrative, communism was yet another foreign occupation, comparable to those faced by the Polish nation in the past (Zubrzycki, 2006). In a similar way, some Polish nationalists perceive LGBTQ+ people as part of a western threat to Polish nationhood (Bratcher, 2020). How this particular perspective of sexual and gender minorities became common has less to do with the inner workings of communism and how it arrived in Poland, and more to do with the function of the Polish Catholic church, which has been a key pillar of Polishness for a long time (Porter-Szücs, 2014; Zubrzycki, 2006).

The Polish nationality, like many national conceptions in Europe, originated amongst the nobility in the late 18th century. Nonetheless, nationality became less dependent on class over time. At first, questions of religion or ethnicity were not relevant to nationality; membership of the nation was civic. This changed throughout the many partitions of Poland in modern history. This advanced the connection of ethnicity (manifesting in language and religion) to nationality (Zubrzycki, 2006).

Religion as an agent in Polish nationalism

In the nationalist narrative, the Polish Catholic church was the guardian of the Poles during communism. In post-WWII Poland, the church and communism were competing for authority, in a society that was vastly different  Polish society before WWII: ethnic Germans were expelled  the Jewish population was largely exterminated, and survivors had migrated.

Catholicism was the religion of many ethnic Poles, a demographic that was not targeted as much during WWII. This enabled the catholicization of Polish nationalism at large (Porter-Szücs, 2014; Zubrzycski, 2006). The communist state, in the meanwhile, was not able to muster the support of the Poles. This culminated in resistance to the authoritarian state becoming intertwined with the Polish Catholic church, an institution that was at the forefront of this political resistance.

Not only political authority, but also moral authority was attributed to the church by the public and the resistance parties that represented themthe end of communism in Poland at the end of the 80s (Porter-Szücs, 2014; Zubrzycski, 2006). Having acquired political and moral legitimacy, conservative Catholic morals found their place in the Polish everyday life (Porter-Szücs, 2014). This makes for an environment in which a large-scale conservative, intolerant stance on LGBTQ+ rights is not unimaginable. The way LGBTQ+ people are portrayed in this society is quite peculiar: comparable to Jews and communists, they are viewed as conspirators and corruptors, and akin to a fifth column within Poland (Bratcher, 2020). This outsideness can to a certain extent be attributed to a dichotomy between conservative, Catholic values and LGBTQ+ rights. 

It is not just through discourse that sexual and gender minorities are othered and excluded, but also through the discriminatory policies that stem from this discourse: PiS is actively dismantling protections for these groupings, for example. Discourse and policy meet in the concept of ‘LGBT-free zones’, i.e. areas in Poland that are demarcated as free of the LGBT-ideology: a politicized way to say that sexual and gender minorities both do not live there and are not welcome to exist there (Human Rights Watch, 2020).

In search for a new discourse

The choice of othering LGBTQ+ people is rooted in the nature of Polish nationalism. This, similar to the choice of the othered group in other nationalisms, is not arbitrary, but socially motivated. Polish nationalism is not just connected to Catholicism, the two seem inseparable. The Polish Catholic church has such a stronghold on Polish nationalism because of the circumstances the society found itself in after WWII. Because of it, this nationalism found itself undergoing catholicization,  excludes LGBTQ+ people. Symptoms of exclusion are clear in current day discourse and policy.

Based on this analysis, it can be argued that Polish nationalism needs to be reconceptualized on the statewide level to allow space for sexual and gender minorities. This is not up to those who already find themselves excluded; it is those who claim ownership of Polish nationalism who would need to adapt the discourse drastically, since it is their discourse which excludes. The process would include small changes e.g., in vocabulary, and large scale changes, i.e. the rejection of heteronormativity and cisnormativity. Impactful parties could be politicians on the national, regional and local levels and members of the Polish Catholic clergy.

Such a change in discourse seems unlikely in light of the aforementioned recent developments in Polish (nationalist) politics, and certainly so in a Poland under the PiS party. Until then, LGBTQ+ people in Poland will find themselves excluded from discourse and politics, and the othering of LGBTQ+ people in Polish nationalism continues.

References

BBC News. (2020, June 14). Polish election: Andrzej Duda says LGBT 'ideology' worse than communism. BBC News. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-53039864

Becker, H.S. (1963). Outsiders: Studies in the sociology of deviance. Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc.

Bratcher, I. (2020). Ideological others and national identifications in contemporary Poland. Nations and Nationalism, 26(3), 677-91. https://doi.org/10.1111/nana.12598

Hechter, M. (2000). Containing nationalism. Oxford University Press.

Human Rights Watch. (2020, August 7). Poland: Crackdown on LGBT activists. Human Rights Watch: https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/08/07/poland-crackdown-lgbt-activists

Porter-Szücs, B. (2014). Poland in the modern world: Beyond martyrdom. John Wiley & Sons Inc.

Zubrzycki, G. (2006). The crosses of Auschwitz: Nationalism and religion in post-communist Poland. University of Chicago Press.